O... M... G...
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Sony-Networks-Lacked-Firewall-Ran-Obsolete-Software-Testimony-103450/
I'm surprised they weren't hacked sooner.
The content of the article does raise some really interesting questions about their compliance with PCI-DSS and how they got through the process...
Tuesday, 10 May 2011
Tuesday, 26 April 2011
Thoughts on Infosec and the AWS outage
I managed to sneak in a quick afternoon visit to Infosec last Wednesday. I'll admit the free (and, quite honestly, excellent) lunch that I'd been invited to by the chaps over at IRM was influential in making sure that I didn't miss the show completely this year. Good food, interesting conversation. Thanks Phil :-)
I'm not entirely sure what I made of this year's show. To my eyes, it seemed quite busy in terms of attendee numbers and a number of the brave souls manning the stands seemed to be losing their voices by the time I got there after lunch. Which means it's probably safe to assume that they'd been kept occupied pitching their wares and handing over the usual treasure trove of pens, t-shirts and cheap puzzles. However. Other than finding out some more positive details on the Forum Systems products and coming across a promising new cloud security vendor (CipherCloud - check 'em out!) I'm not sure that I got too much out of the exhibition. Primarily the same old(er) faces pitching the same old(er) solutions and, unfortunately, the same can probably said of the education streams. Can't help thinking that the information security scene needs an injection of new DNA to breathe some new life, enthusiasm and ideas into what seems to be becoming a somewhat jaded, self-serving and self-congratulatory sector. The irony of my posting that last statement on a blog has not escaped me :-)
Whilst I'm being a little negative, the big story from the cloud computing world has been the downtime over at AWS which even made it on to the BBC web-site: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13160929. We're still awaiting details of the problem (other than that there was a problem with EBS volumes and dependent services) but the biggest surprise(?) was that the issue spanned supposedly isolated availability zones within the affected region. I'm really hoping that the promised "post-mortem" discussing this event provides sufficient detail to enable AWS customers to design for resilience with a full understanding of exactly how isolated availability zones really are...
I'm not entirely sure what I made of this year's show. To my eyes, it seemed quite busy in terms of attendee numbers and a number of the brave souls manning the stands seemed to be losing their voices by the time I got there after lunch. Which means it's probably safe to assume that they'd been kept occupied pitching their wares and handing over the usual treasure trove of pens, t-shirts and cheap puzzles. However. Other than finding out some more positive details on the Forum Systems products and coming across a promising new cloud security vendor (CipherCloud - check 'em out!) I'm not sure that I got too much out of the exhibition. Primarily the same old(er) faces pitching the same old(er) solutions and, unfortunately, the same can probably said of the education streams. Can't help thinking that the information security scene needs an injection of new DNA to breathe some new life, enthusiasm and ideas into what seems to be becoming a somewhat jaded, self-serving and self-congratulatory sector. The irony of my posting that last statement on a blog has not escaped me :-)
Whilst I'm being a little negative, the big story from the cloud computing world has been the downtime over at AWS which even made it on to the BBC web-site: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13160929. We're still awaiting details of the problem (other than that there was a problem with EBS volumes and dependent services) but the biggest surprise(?) was that the issue spanned supposedly isolated availability zones within the affected region. I'm really hoping that the promised "post-mortem" discussing this event provides sufficient detail to enable AWS customers to design for resilience with a full understanding of exactly how isolated availability zones really are...
Friday, 8 April 2011
Latest cloudy ramblings
See, I'm making the most of my recently discovered free(ish!) time by popping up in Computer Weekly talking about the adoption of cloud services by SMEs. Link below:
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2011/04/06/246204/CW-Security-Think-Tank-Whats-holding-up-the-cloud.htm
Some interesting differences in tone and opinions amongst the contributors to this Think Tank piece. When it comes to the use of hybrid cloud models I think I tend more towards the opinions expressed by Christofer Hoff over at http://www.rationalsurvivability.com/blog/?p=3016 rather than the view expressed by the chap from Gartner that cloud providers should be targetting SMEs with hybrid cloud services.
Hybrid is fine if you're talking about mixing your delivery of capabilities across on-premise and cloud, I've always had more of a problem with Hybrid as a way of delivering increased capacity on demand in that it's always seemed the worst of both worlds from a security perspective, i.e. you need to worry about the security problems associated with both models rather than just the one!
And, as Hoff says, "If your Tier-1 workloads can run in a public cloud and satisfy all your requirements, THAT’S where they should run in the first place!"
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2011/04/06/246204/CW-Security-Think-Tank-Whats-holding-up-the-cloud.htm
Some interesting differences in tone and opinions amongst the contributors to this Think Tank piece. When it comes to the use of hybrid cloud models I think I tend more towards the opinions expressed by Christofer Hoff over at http://www.rationalsurvivability.com/blog/?p=3016 rather than the view expressed by the chap from Gartner that cloud providers should be targetting SMEs with hybrid cloud services.
Hybrid is fine if you're talking about mixing your delivery of capabilities across on-premise and cloud, I've always had more of a problem with Hybrid as a way of delivering increased capacity on demand in that it's always seemed the worst of both worlds from a security perspective, i.e. you need to worry about the security problems associated with both models rather than just the one!
And, as Hoff says, "If your Tier-1 workloads can run in a public cloud and satisfy all your requirements, THAT’S where they should run in the first place!"
Friday, 25 March 2011
Fair warning
Wow. Where did Q1 go? Not on blogging obviously :-)
Well, after four years on one assignment I finally get to try something new from the end of next week. It's been a primarily fun and worthwhile four years and I've met some good people in that time (just in case any of my current colleagues are reading!) but it's been tough and I'm looking forward to a new challenge. I'm also looking forward to an assignment that will give me a bit more time to concentrate on this blog and posting a little more regularly than once a quarter.
So, what prompted me to come out of blogging hibernation? High profile hacks! By which I'm thinking HBGary Federal, RSA and Comodo. I can't remember a time when three such hacks happened in such a short space of time and received this amount of publicity. Which is the most interesting? Hard to say. HBGary Federal was interesting because of the contents of the email spool that Anonymous released and the somewhat embarrassing implications for the likes of Bank of America and Morgan Stanley.
Is RSA interesting? Hard to tell as they've been very quiet about what was actually accessed during their compromise and so their customers are in limbo. So, it's interesting in so far as a high profile security firm got 0wned; likely to be more interesting once it becomes apparent what was purloined by the attackers. C'mon RSA, help us all out here!
But the Comodo hack; now that is certainly interesting. See http://www.comodo.com/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03-23.html for details. Almost certainly laying the foundations of a larger hack and demonstrating why the core security measure for most Internet users (SSL) should not be relied upon as strongly as it currently is - it certainly shows that certificate authentication is worthless without strong registration processes and capable registration authorities. To be fair however, and in direct contrast to RSA, Comodo have at least been forthright in explaining the implications of the hack and the certificates issued.
Anyone can get hacked, including those we trust to secure the Internet, so here's hoping that more organisations follow the Comodo approach to notification than the RSA approach.
See you in Q3 :-)
Well, after four years on one assignment I finally get to try something new from the end of next week. It's been a primarily fun and worthwhile four years and I've met some good people in that time (just in case any of my current colleagues are reading!) but it's been tough and I'm looking forward to a new challenge. I'm also looking forward to an assignment that will give me a bit more time to concentrate on this blog and posting a little more regularly than once a quarter.
So, what prompted me to come out of blogging hibernation? High profile hacks! By which I'm thinking HBGary Federal, RSA and Comodo. I can't remember a time when three such hacks happened in such a short space of time and received this amount of publicity. Which is the most interesting? Hard to say. HBGary Federal was interesting because of the contents of the email spool that Anonymous released and the somewhat embarrassing implications for the likes of Bank of America and Morgan Stanley.
Is RSA interesting? Hard to tell as they've been very quiet about what was actually accessed during their compromise and so their customers are in limbo. So, it's interesting in so far as a high profile security firm got 0wned; likely to be more interesting once it becomes apparent what was purloined by the attackers. C'mon RSA, help us all out here!
But the Comodo hack; now that is certainly interesting. See http://www.comodo.com/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03-23.html for details. Almost certainly laying the foundations of a larger hack and demonstrating why the core security measure for most Internet users (SSL) should not be relied upon as strongly as it currently is - it certainly shows that certificate authentication is worthless without strong registration processes and capable registration authorities. To be fair however, and in direct contrast to RSA, Comodo have at least been forthright in explaining the implications of the hack and the certificates issued.
Anyone can get hacked, including those we trust to secure the Internet, so here's hoping that more organisations follow the Comodo approach to notification than the RSA approach.
See you in Q3 :-)
Friday, 21 January 2011
ENISA's latest paper on cloud
I don't usually like to criticise the efforts of others to provide useful (or at least informative) guidance however the latest paper from ENISA on Security and Resilience in Governmental Clouds has provoked me into something of a reaction. And that reaction is meh.
To expand further...
If you're not familiar with cloud computing, it's probably a good document to pick up and have a read through in order to get an idea of what the whole cloud thing is about. But there's nothing startlingly new or original in here - the decision framework is new but I wouldn't say startling. I think some of the flows are troublesome as well as it happens. I'm really not confident that the order of risk assessment, choose deployment model (or "IT Architecture" in ENISA parlance) and then identifying threats is particularly applicable in the real world. I'd have preferred something more along the lines of identify business requirements, identify threats, identify potential solutions, narrow down choice based on trade-off between risk and business benefits, prepare RfP etc... I guess I'm a little uncomfortable with attempting to put security as a blocker right at the start of the process; perhaps I'm just a bit too heretical to work in security these days.
My other problem with the paper is that it suffers from the usual naivety in terms of clumping together all IaaS, PaaS and SaaS providers into the 3 buckets and assuming that you have the same risks regardless of service provider. They fall into the same trap as most of the material in this space by practically treating IaaS, PaaS and SaaS as specifications rather than broad categories. As an example of the problem - if you look at the PaaS offerings of Microsoft Azure, Force.com, Heroku, Google's AppEngine and Terracotta and tell me that you can apply the same risk profiles to platforms offering Ruby, Apex, Java, Python and .NET and administered in a variety of ways using differing authentication and authorisation mechanisms then I'm not playing with you anymore and I'm going to tell your mum. Don't even get me started on the diversity you'll find with SaaS - how can you apply the same risk profiles to services that range from accounting through to collaboration through to authentication or whatever?
But as I say, if you're not familiar with the subject and want to get a grounding then it's not a bad document. But if you are familiar with this space, I'd say read it so that you're not left out in cloud conversation* but overall... meh.
* yes, there is such a beast as cloud conversation, unfortunately it does tend to go pretty much as summarised by Dilbert http://www.dilbert.com/strips/comic/2011-01-07/
To expand further...
If you're not familiar with cloud computing, it's probably a good document to pick up and have a read through in order to get an idea of what the whole cloud thing is about. But there's nothing startlingly new or original in here - the decision framework is new but I wouldn't say startling. I think some of the flows are troublesome as well as it happens. I'm really not confident that the order of risk assessment, choose deployment model (or "IT Architecture" in ENISA parlance) and then identifying threats is particularly applicable in the real world. I'd have preferred something more along the lines of identify business requirements, identify threats, identify potential solutions, narrow down choice based on trade-off between risk and business benefits, prepare RfP etc... I guess I'm a little uncomfortable with attempting to put security as a blocker right at the start of the process; perhaps I'm just a bit too heretical to work in security these days.
My other problem with the paper is that it suffers from the usual naivety in terms of clumping together all IaaS, PaaS and SaaS providers into the 3 buckets and assuming that you have the same risks regardless of service provider. They fall into the same trap as most of the material in this space by practically treating IaaS, PaaS and SaaS as specifications rather than broad categories. As an example of the problem - if you look at the PaaS offerings of Microsoft Azure, Force.com, Heroku, Google's AppEngine and Terracotta and tell me that you can apply the same risk profiles to platforms offering Ruby, Apex, Java, Python and .NET and administered in a variety of ways using differing authentication and authorisation mechanisms then I'm not playing with you anymore and I'm going to tell your mum. Don't even get me started on the diversity you'll find with SaaS - how can you apply the same risk profiles to services that range from accounting through to collaboration through to authentication or whatever?
But as I say, if you're not familiar with the subject and want to get a grounding then it's not a bad document. But if you are familiar with this space, I'd say read it so that you're not left out in cloud conversation* but overall... meh.
* yes, there is such a beast as cloud conversation, unfortunately it does tend to go pretty much as summarised by Dilbert http://www.dilbert.com/strips/comic/2011-01-07/
Monday, 29 November 2010
Security architecture. And cloud computing.
Just a quick plug for my latest article over at Computer Weekly:
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/11/25/244113/Security-Zone-Cloud-computing-puts-the-spotlight-on-security.htm
To be honest, I started off with every intention of writing a generic article about the value of security architecture within which there would be no mention of cloud computing at all. But I couldn't help myself. The fit was too natural. So I prattle on about why security architecture is so valuable (e.g. demonstrable traceability from risk and/or requirement through to deployed solution) and then why this is particularly relevant to cloud deployments in terms of ensuring consistency across delivery models: solutions should share business requirements and business risks regardless of IT delivery model, you just tweak around the logical and physical elements once you know which model you're going for...
Go on, take a look. Feel free to leave comments here if you're so inclined.
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/11/25/244113/Security-Zone-Cloud-computing-puts-the-spotlight-on-security.htm
To be honest, I started off with every intention of writing a generic article about the value of security architecture within which there would be no mention of cloud computing at all. But I couldn't help myself. The fit was too natural. So I prattle on about why security architecture is so valuable (e.g. demonstrable traceability from risk and/or requirement through to deployed solution) and then why this is particularly relevant to cloud deployments in terms of ensuring consistency across delivery models: solutions should share business requirements and business risks regardless of IT delivery model, you just tweak around the logical and physical elements once you know which model you're going for...
Go on, take a look. Feel free to leave comments here if you're so inclined.
Friday, 22 October 2010
Cyber security, national security and the CSR
Well, it's certainly been an interesting week. Firstly we discover that cyberattack ranks right up at the top of the risk list for the UK alongside more familiar terrorist activities. We also discover that there's an extra £650m worth of public funds being set aside to improve our cyberdefences. Setting aside some fairly natural cynicism that pushing the (relatively) cheaper option of boosting our cyberdefences (compared to a fully functional aircraft carrier for example) is nothing more that a nifty political sidestep, I must admit to some interest in seeing where this extra cash is going to go. I can't help feeling a little fear that this money could be wasted in a couple of ways:
i) Supporting the numerous organisations that we already have dealing with cybersecurity in the UK, e.g. CESG (and CSOC), the Cabinet Office (and the OCS), etc and increasing the overall bureaucracy
ii) Purchasing more firewalls and intrusion prevention systems and other easily packaged and easily procured technologies.
The core problems facing HMG and the wider CNI relate to a lack of understanding of the true threats and likely attack vectors together with an unfortunate lack of effective governance for cybersecurity issues. I'm fairly sure that the risk appetites of any number of organisations would shrink dramatically should individuals of the correct seniority be held personally accountable for any security incidents. Of course, in order to get to this position there needs to be the appropriate will and desire to enforce such individuals to take on this responsibility and then money spent on the education of these newly willing volunteers to ensure that they can actually make informed decisions. In the interests of fairness, I think there's also a case to be made for educating many security professionals so that they can discuss threats, vulnerabilities and risks in a manner that can be understood by senior business types - technologies don't really matter so much as the potential business impact. We need to understand the technologies to minimise risk, they need to understand the business impacts so that they can tell us which risks we should be concentrating upon. None of this is news to most of you, and it's been tried before (particularly post Hannigan), but there's still a lot more to be done.
Fingers crossed that this money finds it's way to those who know what needs to be done and not simply thrown at technology - I know it's lot easier to procure a firewall than it is to procure a well-informed Senior Information Risk Owner but I also know which has the most beneficial effect in the long term...
i) Supporting the numerous organisations that we already have dealing with cybersecurity in the UK, e.g. CESG (and CSOC), the Cabinet Office (and the OCS), etc and increasing the overall bureaucracy
ii) Purchasing more firewalls and intrusion prevention systems and other easily packaged and easily procured technologies.
The core problems facing HMG and the wider CNI relate to a lack of understanding of the true threats and likely attack vectors together with an unfortunate lack of effective governance for cybersecurity issues. I'm fairly sure that the risk appetites of any number of organisations would shrink dramatically should individuals of the correct seniority be held personally accountable for any security incidents. Of course, in order to get to this position there needs to be the appropriate will and desire to enforce such individuals to take on this responsibility and then money spent on the education of these newly willing volunteers to ensure that they can actually make informed decisions. In the interests of fairness, I think there's also a case to be made for educating many security professionals so that they can discuss threats, vulnerabilities and risks in a manner that can be understood by senior business types - technologies don't really matter so much as the potential business impact. We need to understand the technologies to minimise risk, they need to understand the business impacts so that they can tell us which risks we should be concentrating upon. None of this is news to most of you, and it's been tried before (particularly post Hannigan), but there's still a lot more to be done.
Fingers crossed that this money finds it's way to those who know what needs to be done and not simply thrown at technology - I know it's lot easier to procure a firewall than it is to procure a well-informed Senior Information Risk Owner but I also know which has the most beneficial effect in the long term...
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